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Don’t expect meaningful fiscal devolution for Wales any time
soon
The debate about the appropriate level of fiscal autonomy for Wales in the wake of the publication the Silk
Commission rumbles on. But while it once looked likely that the Welsh Assembly Government would gain
meaningful tax raising and spending powers, the prospects are now less bright. Adam Evans argues that a
deadly concoction of political incompetence and partisan self-interest have combined to make meaningful
substantial tax devolution an increasingly distant prospect. 
In recent articles I have argued that the f iscal devolution envisaged by the Silk Commission and the UK
Government’s eventual response would not amount to any meaningf ul measure of  f iscal accountability. In
this article I will outline why I have argued this previously and ref lect on why it seems highly unlikely that the
partial devolution of  income tax powers to the National Assembly f or Wales will happen any time soon.
To recap, on the 19th November 2012, the Commission on Devolution in Wales, otherwise known as the Silk
Commission due to the chairmanship of  f ormer Parliamentary and Assembly clerk Paul Silk, published the
report of  its f irst stage of  inquiry on the f iscal accountability of  the National Assembly f or Wales and the
Welsh government  (the second to be published in 2014 is a more general look at the assembly’s powers
and responsibilit ies, see here f or the report).
The report included 33 recommendations on enhancing the Welsh Assembly’s f iscal accountability,
representing devolved control of  25 per cent of  the Welsh Government’s budget. These taxes would
involve the devolution of  smaller taxes: landf ill, stamp duty land tax, long haul air passenger duty and,
subject to a clarif ication of  state aid rules, the aggregates levy. However, the most signif icant
recommendation was f or the part-devolution of  income tax, reducing the income tax brackets by 10 pence
in the pound (with an equivalent amount reduced f rom the block grant; however this tax would only be
devolved subject to an af f irmative vote in a ref erendum).
The UK Government’s delay in responding f ormally to these recommendations has been commented on
previously and would be grace the programme of  any music hall f arce, however it has, af ter redef ining
‘Spring’ to include November, f inally responded in f ull (the f ull UK Government response is available here.
Af ter a year of  deliberation and dither, one could be f orgiven f or asking why so much time was spent on
devolving so litt le. The National Assembly f or Wales and Welsh Government will only be certain of  f iscal
responsibility and accountability f or three f orms of  taxation: the landf ill tax, stamp duty land tax and
business rates (the latter was already partially devolved). Long haul air passenger duty (dearly prized by the
Welsh Government af ter their nationalisation of  Cardif f  Airport) was ruled out on grounds that it could
‘distort’ the market. That potential market distortion should be used in this way is rather intriguing,
particularly when the UK government had not been reticent in using such grounds to hold a consultation,
earlier this year, on the potential devolution of  SDLT.
While that consultation was seen by many in Cardif f  as a f urther attempt by the secretary of  state to delay
f urther devolution, it is rather ironic that such a manoeuvre over APD would be welcomed by devolutionists,
rather than the carte blanche rejection of  this tax being devolved. Indeed a cynic might ponder the dif f erent
f ates of  both these taxes, particularly when the airport that would in all likelihood be most af f ected by the
devolution of  long haul Air Passenger Duty, Bristol, lies in a f ar more polit ically competit ive and rewarding
area f or both the Coalit ion Partners.
Unsurprisingly the coalit ion has endorsed the main Silk recommendation, the partial devolution of  income
tax powers, subject to a successf ul ref erendum being held. However, as I have argued bef ore, the
prospects of  a ref erendum on “Yes to Tax” are particularly bleak. Indeed, the chances of  getting that
proposition to the ballot paper are similarly weak, when one considers that it would take the Welsh Labour
party to agree to such a move.  Af ter all what person, let alone Government, would turn down f ree money
f or money they have to raise themselves. That is the reality of  what Silk and the UK Government are
proposing: optional accountability and the optional increased unpopularity that goes along with f iscal
responsibility.
Unsurprisingly, Welsh Labour has been f irm in stating its reluctance to accept income tax powers, with
Carwyn Jones responding to the government’s init ial announcement with an insistence that the Barnett
f ormula be replaced with a f air f unding f ormula bef ore it could support income tax devolution. It does not
take much in the way of  polit ical genius to see that any such change in the Barnett f ormula is not going to
be f orthcoming bef ore or any time soon af ter a ref erendum on Scottish independence. Furthermore,
whatever leverage could be placed on Labour to accept and more important support an income tax
ref erendum seems to have been lost by the apparent concession of  the one thing they truly prized,
borrowing powers, f or the limited f unding stream provided by SDLT and the landf ill tax (though the UK
Government has implied that higher borrowing limits would be provided if  the Welsh Government’s revenue
stream increases in the f uture).
I have been f airly crit ical of  Welsh Labour in the past f or their posit ion on income tax and while I am loath to
break the habit of  a lif etime, I will f or once say something rather more sympathetic. The model of  income
tax devolution outlined by the UK Government is a lockstep model, as has been devolved to Scotland with
the 2012 Scotland Act, unlike the f ree, independent band setting approach envisioned by Silk. Expecting
Welsh Labour to not only choose to be accountable, but f iscally responsible in a system which makes any
f orm of  tax rises polit ically impossible (because if  one band, i.e. the higher band, pays more, the lower and
middle band payers have to pay more) is naivety bordering on polit ical insanity.
The lock-step is almost ideologically designed to incentivise smaller Government, through across the board
tax cuts or the f iscal status quo at a t ime where the public purse is struggling to maintain services. While
Conservatives may welcome such a tax system, it would be completely unacceptable to Welsh Labour.
We are theref ore lef t with meaningf ul Welsh f iscal accountability being as distant a prospect as bef ore the
Silk Commission was established. A deadly combination of  polit ical incompetence and partisan interests
makes a ref erendum on income tax devolution a distant prospect, in its stead we will become the
Principality of  peanut taxes.
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